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As indicated in chapter 1, there are several ways in which the choice of 
trade strategy (and the policy instruments used to implement it) is linked 
with the demand for labor. First, the trade strategy may influence the 
overall growth rate of  the economy, thereby influencing employment 
through a variety of channels. Next, labor/output and laborhalue added 
ratios  may  differ  significantly  between  industries.  Insofar  as  trade 
strategy influences the structure of  production,  differences in  factor 
proportions between exporting and import substitution industries affect 
the demand for labor. Finally, policy instruments used under alternative 
trade strategies may affect the choice of technique within all or a subset of 
industries, inducing more or less demand for labor than would otherwise 
be the case for the same composition of  output. 
The focus of  the alternative trade strategies and employment project 
was on the second and third of  these links. In part this was because the 
previous project centered on the relationship between trade regimes and 
development. More important, however, was  the consideration that , 
difficult as it is to relate changes in the rate of economic growth to choice 
of trade regimes, it is even more problematic to attempt to delineate the 
precise relationship between the overall rate of  economic growth and 
employment. The reasons for this difficulty are inherent in the complexity 
of the characteristics of  the labor market and the determinants of wage 
rates as discussed in chapter 2. 
For most of this volume, therefore, attention is on the theoretical and 
empirical  relationships  between  trade  strategies  and  employment 
through the effect on composition of  output and on factor substitution, 
without regard to the effect of  differences in growth rates arising from 
alternative trade strategies. Nonetheless, that relationship is too impor- 
tant to be completely overlooked. This chapter, therefore, is devoted to 
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an examination of alternative trade strategies and a review of the results 
of  prior research relating the choice of  strategy to the rate of economic 
growth. In addition, the choice of trade regimes by countries covered in 
this project and their rates of economic growth are examined. It remains 
for chapter 4  to spell out the theory underlying the association between 
alternative trade strategies, the commodity composition of  output, and 
factor proportions. 
3.1  Export Promotion and Import Substitution Strategies 
3.1.1  The Alternatives 
Economic theory indicates that a necessary condition for optimal re- 
source allocation for any country is that the domestic marginal rate of 
transformation (DMRT) among produced commodities should equal the 
international marginal rate of transformation (IMRT) among them. For a 
small country unable to influence its international terms of trade, interna- 
tional prices (f.0.b. for export and c.i.f. for import)’ can be used to reflect 
IMRTs. In the absence of  distortions in the domestic market, domestic 
prices can be used to reflect DMRTs.’ 
It is readily shown that any departure from this optimality rule results 
in a production cost to the economy: when the DMRT between a pair of 
traded  commodities  is  unequal  to  the  IMRT,  switching production 
toward the item with the relatively lower domestic cost enables a country 
to receive more of the other commodity through trade than it can obtain 
through domestic production. 
The optimality  criterion leads naturally  to  a definition  of  bias  of 
alternative trade regimes: bias defines the direction and the degree to 
which, on average, domestic incentives diverge from those that would 
prevail under free trade. The notion is most readily formalized in the 
two-commodity case.  Let p’s represent  international  prices,  and  q’s 
domestic prices, with subscripts rn and x denoting the import-competing 
and export goods respectively. Then, B,  the bias of the regime, can be 
defined simply as: 
qm 
-  4x 
Px 
- 
B=Pm.  (1) 
If the world and domestic prices of exportables coincide and the domestic 
price of import-competing goods is above the world price, B > 1,  and the 
regime is biased toward import substitution. Conversely, if  imports are 
subsidized, then B < 1, and the bias of  the regime is toward exports. 
Naturally, the more B diverges from unity in a particular direction, the 
more biased is the regime. 32  Chapter Three 
When there are many export and many import-competing commod- 
ities, a weighting scheme must be employed to estimate the average bias 
of the regime. In that case both the overall degree and direction of bias 
and the variance in individual price ratios among commodities are of 
interest  .3 
One might anticipate that countries would stay fairly close to uniform 
incentives or that, insofar as they departed from the optimality rule, they 
might do so partly by encouraging some export industries and partly by 
protecting some import-competing industries, with an average bias not 
far from unity. However, while even the countries most oriented toward 
import substitution encourage some exportable industries (at least more 
than others)  and export promotion  countries  normally protect some 
import substitution industries, one rarely encounters a bias of about unity 
in trade regimes with some high levels of protection for import-competing 
industries and some large incentives for export promotion. Instead, a 
number of factors tend to reinforce initial biases in trade regimes and lead 
to significant overall differences in the direction of bias between the two 
trade strategies. 
Consider  first  the  built-in  tendencies  under  import  substitution. 
Although in principle one could encourage domestic production of  an 
import-competing good with subsidies, in practice encouragement to 
domestic production is usually given by imposing either tariffs or quan- 
titative restrictions (in the extreme case, import prohibitions) on imports 
of the commodity. The very act of protecting the domestic industry tends 
to discourage exports in several ways. First, exporters using the protected 
commodiiy as an input to their production process are di~advantaged.~ 
Second, it should be noted that the resources employed in the protected 
industry would otherwise have been employed elsewhere and that, in that 
sense, protection of  import-competing sectors is automatically discrim- 
ination  against  all  other sectors, including potential exporting  ones. 
Third, establishment  of  a new domestic industry usually requires im- 
ported capital goods, and in early stages of its development the value of 
capital goods imported is likely to exceed the international value added of 
import-substituting production.’ This tends to put pressure on the foreign 
exchange markets that could be offset by currency realignment. How- 
ever, under import substitution regimes, there is resistance to currency 
depreciation (in order to facilitate the needed capital goods imports, in 
part), and usually additional quantitative restrictions are employed to 
reduce the size of the balance of payments deficit, further increasing bias 
toward import substitution. 
None  of  these tendencies  constitutes  an inexorable  and inevitable 
outcome of import substitution regimes. In principle, a country could 
decide to protect, say, the metal products sector while simultaneously 
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seldom observed (and, if  it is possible at all, it is probably possible only 
with very moderate levels of encouragement for both sets of activities).6 
Consider now the sorts of  tendencies that are likely to arise under an 
export promotion  strategy. Tariffs cannot  induce production for the 
international market: it requires a production (or an export) subsidy or a 
realistic exchange rate. Since subsidies are costly to government budgets, 
and since their heights are clearly visible, excessively high subsidies tend 
to be  politically unpalatable,  and there is a tendency  to maintain  a 
realistic exchange rate as an alternative (see section 3.1.3.2 for further 
discussion). That in itself encourages exports (and reduces the “balance 
of  payments”  motive for tariff protection), but it limits the degree to 
which there is a differential incentive for exportable production. Simul- 
taneously, producers in exporting industries must be permitted to pur- 
chase their needed intermediate goods and raw materials at world prices 
(and with world quality) if  they are to be competitive. This implies some 
pressure on the authorities to reduce or remove barriers to imports, 
which in turn may tend to encourage other producers to enter the export 
market. Thus a genuine export promotion policy’ must be accompanied 
by the maintenance of  a fairly open and liberalized trade regime, which 
tends to be self-reinforcing. 
For these reasons it makes sense to talk about export promotion and 
import substitution trade policies despite the fact that particular aspects 
of these strategies differ from country to country and that the degree of 
bias can vary significantly between countries and, within the same coun- 
try, between industries. 
3.1.2  The Trade Strategies of  the Countries Included in the Project 
Before turning to other properties of  import substitution and export 
promotion trade regimes, it is instructive to examine one or two salient 
characteristics of  the trade regimes used by the countries covered in the 
project. Table 3.1 gives data that provide a preliminary glimpse of some 
aspects of  the countries’ experience. Estimates are given of  the mean 
effective rate of protection (ERP)8  for all manufacturing activities for sale 
in the home market for the years indi~ated.~  In column 2 the abbrevia- 
tions give a rough idea of the trade strategy in force at the time the ERP 
estimates pertain to. As will be seen below (table 3.4), several countries 
altered  trade  strategies  at one or more  times,  and  their  experience 
permits many inferences about the trade strategies-employment  rela- 
tion. For the periods covered by the ERP estimates, only two countries, 
the Ivory  Coast and  South Korea, were  following generally export- 
oriented trade strategies. Several others, including Brazil in  1967 and 
Colombia in 1969, were in the process of  transition to a more outer- 
oriented set of policies. After 1972, Tunisia also began altering her trade 
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tion-and  greater  disaggregation  generally  implies  more  extremes 
among observations), it is nonetheless highly suggestive that mean pro- 
tection given manufacturing sector producers exceeded 100  percent in all 
countries for the year indicated except for Brazil in 1967 (in the process of 
transition, as already mentioned),  Colombia (also in  transition), the 
Ivory Coast, South Korea (both export-oriented countries), and Thai- 
land. Except for Thailand, these countries correspond to the group that 
eventually eschewed import substitution. Interestingly enough, lower 
mean rates of  effective protection  also appear generally to have been 
accompanied by a relatively narrower range of  ERP rates in individual 
industries and sectors. 
The structure of incentives needs to be examined from another angle. 
A large number of  countries provide export incentives as well as tariff 
protection, so that the same commodity receives a different return when 
sold abroad than when sold domestically, even if  the sale price abroad, 
translated at the official exchange rate, is the same as the sales price in the 
domestic market. This reflects the fact that such instruments as tax 
benefits and direct subsidies per unit of foreign sales are used as export 
incentives. Carvalho and Haddad estimated for Brazil that it required 
only 68 percent of the sales price abroad to compensate the firm for the 
loss of  a sale domestically, once tax incentives and other export induce- 
ments were taken into account. 
Other countries for which there were export incentives that discrimi- 
nated at least to some extent by  place of  sale were Argentina, Chile, 
South Korea, Thailand, and Uruguay. Data on the differences between 
effective rates of protection for sales in the domestic market and abroad 
are given in table 3.2. As can be seen, South Korea’s export industries 
received their encouragement as they exported: they received incentives 
worth about 5 percent of  value added when selling abroad and were 
subject to disincentives when selling domestically equivalent to a nega- 
tive rate of  effective protection of  18 percent. 
By contrast with South Korea, Argentina, Chile, and Thailand pro- 
vided most of their incentives in the form of tariff protection: there were 
few offsetting export subsidies, as is reflected in the low rates of effective 
protection for export. For Uruguay as well, discrimination took a number 
of forms. Data provided by Bension and Caumont (1981) serve primarily 
to confirm that, despite other incentives, the trade regime continued to 
be most powerful: in virtually every line of activity, including those where 
Uruguay presumably has most export potential, the incentives to firms to 
sell in the domestic market substantially exceeded the incentives to sell 
on the world market. The only possible exception was leather products, 
and for that category data were not judged reliable. For Uruguay, as for 
Argentina and Chile, the bias toward import substitution and sale on the 
home market was extremely pronounced. 36  Chapter Three 
Table 3.2  Effective Rates of Protection, Domestic and Foreign Markets 
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South Korea 1968 
Agriculture  19  -  16 
Mining  3  -1 
Export industries  -  18  5 
Import-compe  ting  93  -9 
Manufacturing 
Thailand 1973 
Tapioca flour  -  30  -  30 
Veneer and plywood 
Cordage and rope 
Noncotton textile fabrics 






Food products  150  25 
Footwpar  892  67 
Leather products  20  24 
Chemicals  182  43 
Metal products  463  . 37 
Electrical machinery  591  45 
Sources: Argentina, Nogues 1980, chap. 3, table 2.2; Chile, Corbo and Meller 1981, table 
3.10; South Korea, Hong 1981, table 8.9; Thailand, Akrasanee 1981, table 9.10; Uruguay, 
Bension and Caumont 1981, table 11.7. 
Table 3.3 provides yet another way of characterizing the structure of 
effective protection, this time by end-use category. A hallmark of import 
substitution regimes seems to be that protection is granted first to indus- 
tries producing consumer goods. This is reflected in the extremely high 
level of  protection granted to those industries in Brazil in 1958 and in 
Pakistan in  1970-71.  Were  comparable data available for  Chile and 
Uruguay,  they  would  no  doubt  show a  similarly high  level.’O  South 
Korea’s low overall level of protection, either positive or negative, stands 
out clearly from the data. Likewise, the Brazilian reforms of  the mid- 
1960s and the fairly moderate nature of Colombia’s  incentive structure by 
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Table 3.3  Effective Protection by End-Use Category 
Consumer  Intermediate  Capital 
Country  Period  Goods  Goods  Goods 
Argentina  1969  96  127  162 
Brazil  1958  242  65  53 
1967  66  39  52 
Colombia  1969  33  15  80 
Pakistan  1970-71  277  158  200 
South Korea  1969 
Export  -2  9  -9 
Domestic sale  16  0  56 
Thailand  1973  19  25  77 
Tunisia  1969  74  29  104 
Sources:  Argentina, Nogues 1980, chap. 3, table 2.2; Brazil, Carvalho and Haddad 1981, 
table 2.9; Colombia, Thoumi 1981, table 4.4; Pakistan, Guisinger 1981, table 7.9; South 
Korea, Westphal and Kim 1977, tables 2.A and 2.B; Thailand, Akrasanee 1981, table 9.8; 
Tunisia, Nabli 1981, table 10.6. 
Note:  For Argentina, Colombia,  South  Korea, and Thailand,  the numbers  are simple 
averages: of  consumer  nondurables  and consumer durables for consumer goods; of  in- 
termediate goods I and I1 for intermediate goods; of  transport equipment and machinery 
and equipment for capital goods. 
for those couhtries and time periods. Tunisia’s levels of protection seem 
to be subject to a much wider margin of error than most of the others. The 
ones reproduced here are significantly lower than an alternative set of 
estimates and nonetheless reflect high levels of  protection to both con- 
sumer goods and capital goods producers. 
Regardless of which indicator of  effective protection is used, it seems 
evident that the differentials in incentives between industries are much 
larger under import substitution than under export promotion. These 
incentives are bound to have important influences on the structure of 
production. While effective rates of production can be high both because 
of  the cost structure of  an industry and because of the monopoly power 
that the trade regime may accord to domestic producers, there can be 
little doubt that many of the industries protected under import substitu- 
tion would not, at least with their existing cost structure, be viable under 
an alternative trade regime. Moreover, given the heavy disincentive to 
exporting that characterizes some of  the more extreme import substitu- 
tion regimes, import substitution trade strategies must have discouraged 
the development and expansion of  some of  the potential export indus- 
tries. It is left to chapter 5 to report the differences in labor coefficients, 
and therefore in demand for labor and employment, that are likely to 38  Chapter Three 
arise from the resulting differences in the commodity composition of 
output. 
3.1.3  Policy Instruments Employed under Alternative Trade 
Strategies 
In principle,  the choice of  policy instruments for encouraging new 
industry and rapid economic growth should be largely independent of 
decisions regarding type of trade policy. Indeed, in the optimal resource- 
allocation world defined above, one would anticipate that the sorts of 
incentives offered for establishment and expansion would be indistin- 
guishable between industries whose output competed with imports and 
industries whose output was destined for export. In practice, however, 
policy instruments differ markedly. Partly because some trade policy 
instruments (e.g., tariffs) inherently discriminate between places of sale 
for the same commodity, and partly for other reasons, the two types of 
trade  strategies  generally  imply  a  very  different  mix  of  policy 
instruments. 
There are a variety of reasons why understanding these instruments is 
important. First, knowledge of their magnitude is often a crucial first step 
in empirical estimates of  the incentives offered under a trade and indus- 
trialization strategy. Second, the types of  instruments employed have a 
direct influence on the choice of  industries that are started and also on 
factor proportions in individual firms and sectors. Thus there are direct 
links between the choice of instrument and the implied labor coefficients. 
Finally, a,question of some importance is whether observed differences in 
labor utilization  under alternative  trade strategies are inherently the 
outcome of  the strategy choice or whether instead they may not reflect 
the particular selection of  instruments used to achieve that strategy. I 
shall start by reviewing a “typical” set of instruments employed under an 
import substitution strategy and then contrast it with the sorts of policies 
generally adopted to encourage export industries.” 
3.1.3.1  Policy Instruments under Import Substitutions 
For a variety of reasons (including the important fact that the author- 
ities necessarily have greater ability to affect decisions by domestic pro- 
ducers when the economy is relatively less open), measures to promote 
import substitution tend to consist of  a mixture of  direct quantitative 
controls  over  various  aspects  of  economic  activity  and  of  pricing 
measures. 
Quantitative restrictions can be administered in avariety of ways, some 
more restrictive than others. As Bhagwati (1978) has documented, nega- 
tive lists of goods that may not be imported tend to be less restrictive than 
positive lists of  items that may be imported; regimes in which there are 39  Trade Strategies, Growth, and Employment 
some items for which licensing approval is  automatic  and for which 
bureaucratic delays are avoided tend to be less restrictive than regimes 
where  all licensing applications are individually scrutinized; licensing 
procedures (and the intervals between granting applications) can also 
affect the working of  the system. 
Quantitative restrictions interact with overvalued exchange rates in a 
variety of ways. That there is excess demand for foreign exchange tends 
to create incentives for smuggling and evasion of  the regime (including 
over- and underinvoicing), which in turn usually induces the authorities 
to implement  still further regulations aimed at containing illegal and 
extralegal activities. Those regulations can be exceedingly complex and 
time-consuming, increasing the restrictiveness of  quantitative controls 
beyond their initially intended levels. 
Partly because the exchange rate tends to become increasingly over- 
valued, and partly for other reasons,  there is also a tendency under 
import substitution to employ a variety of  pricing measures to contain 
excess demand for imports. In addition to tariffs, “handling charges,” 
“port duties,” “stamp taxes,” and a number of  other quasi-tariff mea- 
sures have been imposed.I2  Although they apparently rely on price, they 
may sometimes be as prohibitive as any import prohibition. An extreme 
example, cited by Behrman (1976), is the Chilean practice of  imposing 
requirements in times of foreign exchange difficulties that import license 
applications be accompanied by a prior deposit equal to 10,000 percent of 
the value of the license! In Brazil, a law of  similars provided that firms 
importing goocls that could be obtained domestically  would be ineligible 
to receive government contracts. 
The combined use of  quantitative restrictions and quasi-pricing mea- 
sures can provide almost any industry with sufficient protection to enable 
it to produce profitably for the domestic market, almost regardless of the 
degree to which its relative costs exceed those obtaining internationally.” 
Combining use of incentive measures such as prohibitive protection with 
import licensing can give the government virtually complete control over 
choice of  industries: the fact that many, if  not most, capital goods and 
many intermediate goods are imported means that the authorities can, 
through import licensing, affect or control the allocation of capital among 
industries.  l4 
Thus the hallmarks of an import substitution regime generally include: 
high levels of protection to a number of industries, with a very wide range 
of  rates of effective protection; fairly detailed and complex quantitative 
controls and bureaucratic regulations, both over imports directly and 
often over a number of areas of  domestic economic activity (sometimes 
through  the import regime);  and  an overvalued  exchange rate with 
associated disincentives for exporting. 40  Chapter Three 
3.1.3.2  Policy Instruments under Export Promotion 
For policymakers committed to encouraging industrial development 
and growth through exporting, most of the instruments employed under 
import substitution are either totally infeasible or demonstrably incom- 
patible with promoting exports. By definition,  tariffs cannot be used as an 
instrument of export promotion, and even tariff rebates do no more than 
offset the disincentive to export that imposing a tariff would otherwise 
create. 
Likewise, quantitative restrictions upon imports are almost entirely 
incompatible with export promotion: not only is it administratively ex- 
tremely difficult to compensate exporters for the excess of domestic over 
foreign price in the presence of  quantitative restrictions, but a genuine 
export promotion drive must permit exporters ready access to the same 
quality and variety of  inputs that their foreign competitors have. 
Furthermore, both because of  the visible cost of  export subsidies and 
because of  the incompatibility of  quantitative controls with export pro- 
motion,  an overvalued exchange rate  is  seldom encountered for any 
substantial period of time among export promotion ~0untries.I~  In South 
Korea, for example, in the early 1960s export subsidies were introduced 
between alterations in the exchange rate. But these subsidies decreased 
in importance over time as the government learned the cost of maintain- 
ing them. In 1964  the official exchange rate was 214 won per dollar, while 
export subsidies were 67 won per dollar, adding about 30 percent to the 
effective export exchange rate over the official exchange rate. By  the 
early 1970s, export inducements beyond the official rate consisted largely 
of  internal tax exemptions, customs duty exemptions, and interest rate 
subsidies, none of which had the same direct effect on payments by the 
government. Even then, the total value per dollar of these inducements 
had increased only to 105 won  per dollar, compared with an official 
exchange rate of 392 in 1972. Thereafter, the proportionate and absolute 
value  of  subsidies declined  still further, reaching 81  won  per  dollar 
contrasted with an official rate of  485 per dollar in  1975 (see Krueger 
1979, tables 22 and 32). 
Not only does export promotion have to rely upon pricing incentives 
rather than quantitative controls, but there are significant and visible 
constraints on the degree to which incentives can be differentiated among 
exporting activities,I6  as a substitute for a realistic exchange rate. The 
major incentives for  export promotion  found  in  other  countries are 
similar to those for South Korea: export subsidies (usually expressed as a 
rate of  local currency paid beyond the official exchange rate per unit of 
foreign currency sales); favorable treatment for exporters with regard to 
tax  liabilities;  and  availability  of  credit  at  below-market  rates  of 
interest.”’  In Brazil, for example, domestic tax exemptions were the 
main instruments used to encourage exports above a realistic (sliding 41  Trade Strategies, Growth, and Employment 
peg) exchange rate policy. Carvalho and Haddad (1981) estimate that 
selling a product domestically yielded about the same after-tax profit to a 
firm  as  selling the item  abroad  for  about  two-thirds the price.  The 
important point is that these incentives are provided to anyone who 
exports. They provide a uniform degree of bias among exporting activi- 
ties. By contrast, a set of prohibitive tariffs usually entails highly varied 
protective content for different activites (with a very low, if not negative, 
degress of  effective protection for exports). 
The question to  which we now turn is what differences there have been 
in  growth performance under the two strategies. Later chapters will 
consider the effect of each set of policy instruments upon the commodity 
composition of output and the factor proportions in individual industries. 
3.2  Relationship of Trade Strategies to Growth Rates 
3.2.1  Growth Rates under Import Substitution and Export 
Promotion 
The determinants of  a country’s rate of economic growth are numer- 
ous, and there is no universally agreed-upon method of  quantifying the 
contribution of any particular factor to the growth rate.I9  This is especially 
the case when it comes to identifying the role of  a variable that may, in 
part, affect the efficiency of resource allocation. Consider, for example, 
two economies that both have the same rate of  capital formation and 
initially equhl  output.  In one economy, new  capital is employed  in 
less-than-optimal uses, with a consequently high capital/output ratio and 
a low rate of growth. In the other economy, capital is optimally allocated, 
with the consequence that the capital/output ratio is considerably lower 
and the rate of economic growth higher. Without detailed and compara- 
ble data for the two countries, it would be difficult, if  not impossible, to 
identify the role of  superior resource allocation in affecting the rates of 
economic growth: capital formation would, in the absence of  any other 
factor contributing to growth, account for 100 percent of  the growth in 
each country. This difficulty illustrates one of the problems of attempting 
to associate  alternative trade strategies with  growth rates:  the trade 
strategy itself is but one influence on the effectiveness with which other 
factors of production are employed. 
The matter is further confounded by the consideration that, even in 
theory, the role of trade, and the optimal fraction of trade in GNP, will 
differ across countries. South Korea, with her very poor natural resource 
endowment, for example, undoubtedly has a higher optimal share of 
exports and imports in GNP than  does, say, Turkey. It is therefore 
difficult, if  not impossible, to separate export growth, and its contribution 
to overall economic growth, into that component which is a result of 42  Chapter Three 
starting from a suboptimal role of  trade in GNP and that component 
which is a consequence of  “normal” export growth. 
Nonetheless, past research results are highly suggestive of  an asso- 
ciaton between trade strategies and growth rates, whether the evidence 
cited is impressionistic based on the experiences of  countries that have 
altered their trade strategies, or whether the evidence is estimation of the 
statistical relationship of growth rates with explanatory variables, includ- 
ing the behavior of exports. In this section, some of the evidence is briefly 
summarized.  Thereafter  the growth rates and trade strategies of  the 
countries covered in the project are reviewed. Finally, possible reasons 
for the difference in growth performance are discussed. 
3.2.1.1  Results from Prior Research 
There are four cross-country estimates of the role of exports in growth. 
Not surprisingly, in light of  the lack of  a theoretical underpinning, the 
estimates differ in techniques used, as well as in countries covered and 
period of observation. What is perhaps surprising and reassuring is that, 
despite these differences, the conclusions arising from the four studies are 
very similar. 
The first estimate, by Michalopoulos and Jay (1973), essentially pos- 
ited an aggregate neoclassical production function with domestic capital, 
foreign capital, and labor as inputs. They fitted it with data for thirty-nine 
developing countries for the period covering the 1960s. Having done so, 
they reestimated including exports as an additional independent variable. 
Michalopoulos and Jay found that exports were highly significant, and 
significantly improved the fit of  the equation, concluding: 
The growth rate of  GNP and the growth rate of  exports are highly 
correlated with each other. Export growth rates explain a significant 
portion of  the variance in income growth rates which remain unex- 
plained by the growth in primary inputs. This empirical relationship is 
of  basic importance to our findings. [Michalopoulos and Jay 1973, 
The second study was undertaken by Michaely (1977). He estimated 
the relationship between the change in the proportion of exports to GNP 
(to eliminate the obvious bias resulting from the fact that an increase of 
one unit of  exports is an increase of  one unit in GNP) and the rate of 
change in GNP for forty-one countries over the period 1950 to 1973. He 
found a coefficient of Spearman rank correlation between the two of  .38, 
which was  significant at the  1 percent level, although  there was  no 
correlation between the growth rate and the mean proportion of exports 
in GNP.” 
The third estimate was for the countries covered in the NBER project 
on foreign trade regimes and economic development. Using data for the 
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ten countries over the period roughly covering 1953 to 1972 (depending 
on data availability for countries’ starting and ending points) ,  observa- 
tions  on  GNP across countries were  fitted on  a pooled  time-series- 
cross-section basis. Thus the GNP growth rate for each country was 
regressed against a time trend in that country’s growth and the rate of 
growth for its exports. A separate coefficient for the time trend was 
estimated for each country, but the coefficient expressing the contribu- 
tion of export growth to GNP growth was common for all countries. For 
the countries covered, an increase in the rate of growth of export earnings 
of  one percentage point annually was associated with an increase in the 
rate of  growth of  GNP of about 0.1  percentage point (see Krueger 1978, 
chap.  11, for details). If  this estimate implied causation (which, for 
econometric reasons as well as because of  the analytical difficulties dis- 
cussed above, it does not), it would imply that the South Korean growth 
rate in the late 1960s was about four percentage points higher than it 
would have been had export earnings been stagnant. To be sure, such an 
inference is far more precise than either the data or the theory warrant. 
Nonetheless,  the results were,  once again,  strongly indicative of  an 
important link between export growth and the overall growth rate. 
Finally, Balassa (1978b) took data for eleven countries (many of them 
overlapping the countries covered by Krueger 1978) for 1960 to 1973 and 
reestimated  the  Michaely  relations,  incorporating  also  the  Michalo- 
poulos-Jay factors of  production. His results generally confirm those of 
both Michaely and Michalopoulos-Jay, and he noted the similarity of his 
results to the Krueger results. According to his estimates (based on actual 
factor accumulation paths), 
the increase in Korea’s GNP would have been 37 percent smaller if  its 
export growth rate equalled the average for all countries concerned. 
The corresponding proportion is 25 percent for Taiwan. At the other 
extreme, in  Chile, India, and Mexico, respectively, the increase in 
GNP would have been 14, 12 and 8 percent greater if  those countries 
had average export growth rates. [p. 1871 
Balassa noted, as did Krueger, that the results obtained, when applied to 
individual countries, underestimated the effects of  export growth on 
GNP. Despite that, the results are further evidence that the benefits to be 
derived from an export promotion exceed, perhaps substantially, those 
from an import substitution trade strategy. 
3.2.1.2 
Table  3.4 gives  an  indication  of  each of  the  ten  countries’ trade 
strategies and rates of  growth  of  export  earnings and of  real  GDP. 
Although the degree of bias of the trade regime has changed from time to 
time in all countries, some have experienced a much greater degree of 
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Table 3.4  Trade Strategy, Export Growth, 
and Real GDP Growth, Project Countries 
Average Annual 
Rate of  Growth 
Trade  Export  Real 
Strategy  Earnings  GDP 
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1970-76  EP 
1960-70  IS 
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1960-72  EP 
1953-60  IS 
1960-70  IS 
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1960-70  EP 
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1970-76  MIS 
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Sources: Trade strategy: based upon evidence in country studies (Krueger et al. 1981). 
Export growth rates: computed from data in May 1977 International Financial Statistics. 
GDP growth rates: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World De- 
velopment  Report 1978 and World  Tables 1976; United  Nations  Yearbook of  National 
Accounts Statistics, vol. 2, for 1971 and 1969. 
Notes:  EP =  export promotion; IS  =  import  substitution;  MIS  = moderate import 
substitution. 
"GNP growth rate is for 1950 to 1960. 
stability in their trade orientation than others. Chile, for example, con- 
sistently followed import substitution policies until 1974, and fluctuations 
in the degree of bias toward import substitution were associated primarily 
with fluctuations in the price of copper (and therefore in export earnings) 
and with balance of  payments crises. Uruguay, too, was consistently 
strongly biased toward import substitution and has only recently moved 
toward a more export-oriented policy. For purposes of  analysis in the 45  Trade Strategies, Growth, and Employment 
period covered, Uruguay is an import substitution country. The Ivory 
Coast has also followed a fairly consistent policy over the entire period 
since independence,  but it has had the opposite bias-toward  export 
promotion.  Monson  notes that  in  1974-75  some policies were  being 
adopted that shifted the regime toward somewhat greater encourage- 
ment of import substitution industries. Nonetheless, his data are for the 
earlier export promotion period. 
Contrasted with those cases of relatively unaltered trade policy are the 
countries that radically changed their orientation. As already mentioned, 
Brazil, South Korea, and Colombia are in that group, since all three 
switched away from import substitution and toward export promotion. In 
addition, Indonesia should probably be regarded as a country with an 
abrupt change, in that the period before 1965 was one of extreme restric- 
tiveness of  the system. The inflation rate was more than 100 percent 
annually, and export earnings were lagging badly. Pitt focuses on the 
period since 1965, during which Indonesia was moving away from ex- 
change controls toward full currency convertibility. Despite easing ex- 
change controls, Indonesia protected a number of  domestic industries. 
As a consequence, her regime since 1965 is best characterized as “moder- 
ate” in its bias toward import substitution. 
Tunisia had  a fairly strong bias in her trade and payments regime 
toward import substitution in the 1960s but in the early 1970s began to 
change incentives toward greater encouragement of  exports. However, 
the period covered by Nabli centers upon the early 1970s. At that time 
incentives for import substitution remained very strong contrasted with 
those  for exporting. For purposes  of  analyzing the trade strategies- 
employment  relation,  therefore, Tunisia should also be regarded  as 
oriented toward import substitution. 
Thailand represents a case very similar to Tunisia, except that the bias 
toward import substitution was somewhat less than in Tunisia. In the 
1960s, the Thai regime appears to have been moderately biased toward 
import substitution. By the early 1970s, measures were being taken that 
decreased the magnitude of  the bias; Akrasanee’s data pertain to the 
period 1971-73,  during which it is probable that the moderate incentive 
structure of the 1960s was still the dominant influence on the commodity 
composition of  output and pattern  of  trade.  After  1973 government 
intervention increased  and more  measures were  introduced both  to 
promote manufactured exports and to foster further import substitution. 
Finally, Pakistan represents a country moving away from an extreme 
bias toward import substitution, which was the case in the 1950s, toward a 
somewhat less unbalanced incentive structure in the 1960s. Guisinger 
characterizes Pakistan of  the 1960s as having a much more liberalized 
regime, with considerably more balanced incentives, than was true in the 
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1950s removed some of the discrimination against exports that had pre- 
viously existed in the regime. Nonetheless, as can be seen from table 3.4, 
bias toward import substitution was still substantial.21 
Column 2 of table 3.4 gives the rates of growth of export earnings for 
the periods indicated. It is readily apparent that shifting to export promo- 
tion generally resulted in much-improved performance with regard to 
exports. The shifts in Brazil, Colombia, and South Korea were all highly 
dramatic, but Pakistan’s improved rate of growth of export earnings was 
also important for that country. The large positive rate of  growth of 
export earnings for Indonesia also represented an abrupt departure from 
the earlier stagnation experienced under Sukarno. Tunisia’s increased 
rate of  growth of  export earnings over the period 1970-76  reflects rapid 
growth of petroleum products, other primary products (especially phos- 
phates), and manufactured exports. Because oil price increases dominate 
Indonesia’s recent export earnings statistics, the Indonesian performance 
was computed over the period ending in 1973. 
The final column of table 3.4  gives the growth rates of real GDP  for the 
same periods as those covered by columns 1 and 2. The overall impres- 
sion is similar to the results reviewed in section 3.2.1.1.  As can be seen, 
there appears to be a significant association between rates of  growth of 
GDP and of  exports, although it is by no means a perfect one. Brazil’s 
export earnings were actually declining between 1955 and 1960, while 
real GDP grew at an average annual rate of  almost 7 percent, and a 
similar contrast can  be  seen in the South Korean  data for  1953-60. 
Conversely, Chile’s relatively high rate of  growth of export earnings in 
the 1960s was not accompanied by rapid growth of real GDP.u Colombia 
is also a partial exception, in that the rate of growth of exports reversed 
from a negative 0.8 percent to a positive 17 percent annually, while the 
increase in real GDP was about two percentage points annually. To be 
sure, that represented a doubling in the rate of  growth of  per capita 
income, but it was far less striking than the change in the Brazilian or 
South Korean growth rates following their reversals of  policy and of 
trends in export growth. 
3.2.2  Reasons for Differences in Performance 
An important question is why  there are such differences in growth 
performance. The simple theory of optimal resource allocation is prob- 
ably not enough, and there is no single, universally agreed-upon diagno- 
sis of  the reasons for the difference and the quantitative importance of 
each factor contributing to differences in growth rates. What instead 
seems to be possible is an analysis of  what has happened under import 
substitution and under export promotion, which points to some of  the 
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3.2.2.1  Import Substitution 
At a descriptive level, the proximate reasons why growth rates tapered 
off  can be traced. There are three important factors. The first concerns 
the increasing restrictiveness of  the trade and payments regime under 
import  substitution; the second is the relatively rapid  exhaustion of 
opportunities for “easy” import substitution; and the third relates to the 
tendency for import substitution strategies  to be administered by detailed 
and complex quantitative restrictions. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
Thereafter the descriptive factors are related to the conventional con- 
cepts of  economic analysis. 
Turning to the first factor, in most countries that adopted the import 
substitution strategy the growth rate of export earnings (and earnings of 
foreign exchange from other sources) diminished once the strategy had 
been adopted. In part this diminution in the foreign exchange receipts 
was the conscious outcome of the import substitution plan: dependence 
on trade was intended to diminish. However, the growth of  export and 
other foreign exchange earnings was generally slower than anticipated 
(probably for the reasons discussed in section 3.1.3.1). 
Simultaneously with a declining rate of  growth of  foreign exchange 
availability, the growth in demand for imports and foreign services should 
have decelerated, but instead it tended to accelerate. The growing gap 
between growth in demand and growth in supply of  foreign exchange 
under import substitution caused severe difficulties in many countries. 
Meanwhile, virtually every new import substitution industry, and even 
every expansion of  existing import substitution industries, required im- 
ports of  raw materials, intermediate goods, and machinery and equip- 
ment.  Policymakers were especially reluctant  to deny permission for 
imports of  these goods, since they feared that reducing capital goods 
imports would reduce the growth rate and that reducing intermediate 
goods and raw material imports would adversely affect output and em- 
ployment. “Dependence” upon imports for final consumption goods was 
replaced with “dependence” upon imports not only for growth via the 
availability of capital goods but also for employment and output, since 
the newly established factories could not produce without needed in- 
termediate goods and raw materials. 
Structurally, therefore, the level of  employment and output and the 
rate of  capital formation within the import substitution sectors became 
dependent upon the availability of  foreign exchange. The import sub- 
stitution strategy ironically appeared to result in an economy even more 
dependent upon trade than had been the case under the earlier pattern of 
primary  commodity specialization, while simultaneously discouraging 
the growth of  foreign exchange earnings. 
In many import substitution countries, increased dependence upon 
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balance of  payments crises.23  These crises, in turn, were associated with 
intervals during which import licensing became particularly stringent, if 
not prohibitive. The authorities had run down foreign exchange reserves 
and borrowed from abroad to the maximum extent in order to maintain 
the growth rate. Finally, however, resources were exhausted. The period 
during which import licensing had to be slowed generally was associated 
with a period of  slow growth, if  not an outright reduction in output. 
Proximately at least, foreign exchange was the binding constraint upon 
the growth rate, and models of “foreign exchange shortage,” most nota- 
bly the two-gap model (see Chenery and Strout 1966), characterized 
import  substitution economies dependent  upon  imports for their in- 
termediate  goods and levels of  investment, while simultaneously ex- 
periencing slow growth of  exports. Very often these periods of  severe 
import restriction ended with a devaluation and stabilization program 
designed to make exporting more attractive, at least temp~rarily.~~ 
The second factor contributing to the slowing down of  growth rates 
under import substitution was the exhaustion of the “easy” import sub- 
stitution opportunities.  Even in large countries with sizable domestic 
markets, such as Brazil, the domestic market was not large enough to 
support the development of  industries at economic scales of production 
after import substitution had taken place in the industries that catered to 
large numbers of relatively poor consumers. After import substitution in 
industries such as textiles and shoes, where imports were sizable and 
outputs fairly standard, it appears that additional industries were gener- 
ally established at uneconomically small size. Once “easy” import sub- 
stitution was over, the incremental capital/output ratio in the industrial 
sector rose  sharply, and the “leading  growth sector”  experienced  a 
diminution in its growth rate.25 
The third reason for the tapering off of  growth rates was the complex 
nature of the instrument mix under import substitution. Bhagwati (1978) 
has carefully delineated the reasons why controls tended to multiply: the 
obviously imperfect across-the-board allocation techniques resulted in 
ever-finer classifications, as imports were allocated by category of  com- 
modity being imported, by type of user of the commodity domestically, 
by source of  foreign exchange, and even by type of  use-capital good, 
intermediate good, or raw material. The proliferation  of  the control 
network and its complexity seems to have been a common feature of 
import substitution regimes and is certainly a characteristic that must 
have had harmful consequences. 
Moving from the descriptive to the analytical level, also, one can link 
these three tendencies with standard constructs of economic theory. One 
can fairly well pinpoint some of  the things that went wrong, although 
quantification of their contribution to the outcome is difficult. There are 
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In static terms, import substitution proceeds only with a high, and 
probably  increasing,  variance  among  activities in  domestic resource 
costs. As already seen, rates of  effective protection of  several hundred 
percent are not infrequent. Instances where the imports for producing 
domestically exceed the import value of the final product are not unheard 
of. High-cost, low-quality output is visible to everyone. It may be that this 
phenomenon is only an economist’s characterization of the “exhaustion 
of easy import substitution,” or it may be something more fundamental. 
Either way, there is a tendency in almost all cases for import substitution 
to become “indiscriminate,”  with attendant high costs and low growth 
rates.  Once consumer goods are virtually removed  from the eligible 
import list, each new import substitute implies increasing costs for some 
domestic consumer goods industry and also for whatever industries might 
have had export potential. That, in turn, implies higher domestic prices 
and a lower rate of growth of domestic consumption than would occur if 
prices did not rise. An almost-universal pattern is the overestimation of 
the probable size of  the domestic market, as entrepreneurs underesti- 
mate the extent to which demand is price responsive. 
The “indiscriminate,” high-cost pattern of import substitution may or 
may  not  be  inevitable.  In large part  it  arises because policymakers, 
confronted with “foreign exchange shortage” as described above, under- 
standably want to allocate foreign exchange to capital goods and inputs 
for existing plants. Incentives are almost always provided to begin domes- 
tic production of anything that can be produced; an extremely powerful 
incentive (and perhaps a necessary one for some high-cost industries that 
would have little or no hope of  becoming profitable even in the face of 
high  tariff  walls) is the willingness of  the authorities in most import 
substitution countries to prohibit the importation of  goods competing 
with domestic output. Once a domestic plant is established, the producer 
is secure in that competing imports are not permitted. 
In addition to the high variance in incentives and in domestic resource 
costs that result from import licensing, quantitative restrictions and their 
administration impose other costs. In particular, the licensing authorities 
are caught in a dilemma: if licenses are “fairly” administered, all have to 
be given equal access to them. Rules are set up for “fair” allocation of 
valuable licenses. Those rules, in turn, establish new rigidities in the 
system. Some of  these are dynamic and are discussed below. Others, 
however, affect static resource allocation. For example, in many coun- 
tries licenses are in one way or another prorated across applicants among 
existing firms. Most  variants  of  this procedure  implicitly grant  each 
producer licenses in proportion to his share of  the market; not only are 
there two few firms for competition, but each producer is really provided 
with assurance that his share is fixed. This phenomenon is undoubtedly at 
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products produced in import substitution industries, and also for high and 
rising capitaylabor ratios with falling rates of  capacity utilization. 
The second analytical component has to do with the sorts of  market 
structures created by import substitution policies. The existence of  im- 
port licensing, together with the fact that firms require imports of  in- 
termediate goods, often results in rigid market shares for individual firms 
under import substitution. Indeed, when the quantity of  an imported 
input stands in fixed proportion to output, even the industry’s total sales 
are rigidly fixed. Profitable firms generally expand little, if  at all, more 
rapidly than others, in part because they are unable to increase their 
share of import licenses (and thus have little incentive to reduce the price 
of  their output).  The small size of  the domestic market, which was 
already seen to tend to lead to firms of smaller than economic size, also 
implies that the number of firms in any particular industry will be small. 
Indeed, policymakers are caught on the horns of  a dilemma even if they 
perceive the difficulties that the absence of  competition can create: if 
there are enough firms to permit a healthy degree of  competition, it is 
highly likely that the size of  the individual firms will be so small that 
industry  costs will  be  high  on  that  account.  If, on the other hand, 
monopoly is permitted in order to avoid uneconomically small firms, a 
competitive spur to higher productivity will be lacking. Both this consid- 
eration and the mechanics of  import licensing tend to discourage the 
establishment of  new firms and plants in existing industries: the author- 
ities are naturally reluctant to permit scarce foreign exchange to be used 
to import capital goods to produce a commodity where domestic produc- 
tion is already believed to be adequate to meet domestic demand (and 
where indeed excess capacity may exist). The absence of  competition or 
the small size of  domestic firms, or both, leads to X-inefficiency and 
relatively high capital/labor ratios, again tending to reduce growth rates. 
Turning from static to dynamic considerations, additional problems 
arise with an import substitution strategy over time. Stated in its most 
general way, that quantitative restrictions regulate trade and payments 
leads to a built-in tendency for relative prices and incentives to diverge 
from their optimum over time. Currencies tend to become increasingly 
overvalued, with ever fewer incentives for exporters and greater and 
greater rewards for those able to obtain import licenses. 
Simultaneously,  that  competititon  is  fairly  well  precluded  for  the 
reasons indicated  above  means that producers  are not  under  strong 
pressures to increase productivity, improve quality, or otherwise become 
more efficient over time. Indeed, not  only are incentives absent for 
individual firms, but  the necessity for “fairness”  on the part  of  the 
authorities implies that the sorts of  mechanisms that operate in market 
economies to enable the more productive firm to grow more rapidly are 
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ducers are generally awarded their share of  import licenses on the same 
basis as are less successful, high-cost producers. Most of the competitive 
mechanisms for weeding out the less efficient producers (and therefore 
raising average industry productivity over time)  are obviated by  the 
regulations and incentives established in support of the import substitu- 
tion strategy. 
3.2.2.2  Export Promotion 
If  one turns to the probable  reasons why  exports have generated 
generally higher growth rates than import substitutions, one finds they 
are of two kinds. On one hand, there is the fact that export promotion, by 
its nature, avoids some of the costs of the import substitution strategy. On 
the other hand, there are identifiable gains in output for given inputs that 
are attainable under export promotion. Identification of these elements is 
not sufficient to permit quantitative estimates of  their relative impor- 
tance. It does, however, increase understanding of the contrasts between 
the two industrialization strategies. 
Perhaps the most important lesson that has been learned from the 
experience of  the successful exporting countries is that identification of 
industrialization and the development of new industries with the import 
substitution policy is fundamentally mistaken. For, in all the countries 
that shifted toward export promotion, a striking feature of  their success 
was the very rapid growth of manufactured exports, and often of exports 
of  newly produced products. While it is obvious that a firm starting to 
produce a product previously not manufactured in a country is very likely 
to sell to the domestic market first simply because of  transport  cost 
differentials, experience demonstrates that this is not inevitable. In fact, 
one major way of  starting new industries and new product lines in the 
exporting countries has been for firms in developed countries to subcon- 
tract with foreign suppliers to fabricate particular parts and components. 
In some instances the foreign buyer provides technical specifications, 
technical assistance, and even capital. The foreign buyer may enter into a 
joint management or ownership arrangement to produce the subcon- 
tracted product, but ownership is not an essential part of  the arrange- 
ments. In some cases the entire output may be sold abroad initially, with 
foreign orders filled first and the domestic market satisfied second. Such 
instances, though recorded, are probably the exception rather than the 
rule (see Suh 1975). Nonetheless, the exceptions point to the important 
fact that new  industries  are developed and expand  under  an export 
promotion strategy, and industrialization is by  no means synonymous 
with import substitution. 
From an analytical viewpoint, the importance of  the recognition that 
new industries can start under either strategy is severalfold. First, it 
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protection-that  one should subsidize an “infant” product rather than 
impose a tariff-was  empirically very important, although perhaps for 
different reasons than the “consumption cost” arguments initially put 
forth. Second, it raises a number of questions about the determinants of 
productivity growth within individual industries. Third, it raises ques- 
tions about the determination of  comparative advantage within the in- 
dustrial sector and how it changes in the course of economic growth. The 
first  two  questions are  addressed  here.  The third  is  the  subject of 
chapter 4. 
While, as seen above, economic theory indicates that exporting and 
import substitution industries should both be at sizes where the marginal 
cost of  earning a unit of  foreign exchange is equated with the marginal 
cost of  saving a unit of  foreign exchange in each line of  activity, that 
precept gives no hint as to the likely proportion of  resources going to 
import substituting and exporting industries at the optimum. One factor 
of some importance in yielding high-cost import substitution activities has 
been the very small size of domestic plants. To the extent that there are 
significant indivisibilities or scale economies in industrial operation, the 
economic costs of failing to expand plants and industries to sizes adequate 
to serve more than the domestic market are significantly greater than 
suggested by consideration of  the gains from trade implied by the static 
comparative advantage model.  The lower transport  costs between  a 
country and its major trading partners, the greater will be the advantages 
of longer production runs and of building optimal-sized plants contrasted 
with the,advantages of introducing more, smaller new industries catering 
to the home market. Conversely, the larger the minimum efficient size of 
plant, the greater will be the economic costs of catering only to the home 
market. 
The only piece of  quantitative evidence available on this point comes 
from the South Korean experience. There an attempt to estimate the 
importance of  scale economies in manufacturing industries as a factor 
contributing to the rate of  growth of  industrial output resulted  in  an 
estimate that about 18 percent or one-sixth of  the growth in industrial 
output between 1966 and 1968 was the result of  achieving scale econo- 
mies or overcoming problems associated with small size (Nam 1975). 
There have also been occasional suggestions that capital-intensive indus- 
tries tend to have larger minimum efficient sizes and higher costs of 
operating below those sizes than do labor-intensive industries. If  that is 
the case, and if  an import substitution strategy tends to encourage the 
development of  more capital-intensive industries than does an export 
promotion strategy,26  that further contributes to the incremental output 
gains achieved under an export promotion strategy. 
That the domestic markets of  most developing countries may be too 
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the infant industry argument for protection-that  it imposes costs on 
consumers and that a production subsidy would be preferable-even 
more forceful than  was  earlier thought.  Because, to the extent that 
import substitution is really a way  of  fostering infant industries, it is 
inefficient in discriminating between markets based upon place of  sale: 
efficient development of new industries in most cases probably entails an 
expansion  beyond  the boundaries of  domestic markets.  An efficient 
industrialization strategy is thus seen to be one in which incentives, when 
granted, induce activity at minimum efficient size, and for that purpose 
they must be based upon production, not the destination of  output. 
Before concluding that the gains from export promotion  originate 
largely from the opportunities a larger market provides for minimum- 
efficient-sized  operations, however, we should look at two related consid- 
erations. On one hand, export promotion permits the rapid expansion of 
the most successful new firms and industries, in addition to enabling 
initial entry at economically efficient size. On the other hand, firms in an 
exporting environment are generally confronted with international com- 
petition and do not face the sheltered domestic markets they face under 
import substitution. 
Little is known about the dynamics of productivity increase: it is not at 
all clear the extent to which increases in output per head are achieved 
within existing plants; by new, higher-productivity firms driving out older 
ones; and by  competition  among firms with  the share of  firms with 
above-average productivity increasing and the shares of firms with below- 
average productivity decreasing. Even if the contribution of each of these 
three sources of  productivity increase were known, the extent to which 
productivity gains of any sort were the result of competition among firms 
would remain an open question. In a monopolistic setting, for example, it 
might with fairness be asserted that productivity growth could be slow 
because of  the absence of  a competitive spur or because the entrepre- 
neurial skill of  management was poor, or for other reasons. 
3.2.3  Conclusions 
The evidence is strong that growth performance seems better under 
export promotion than under import substitution. Some of  the reasons 
this is so are readily apparent. What is not known is the relative impor- 
tance of each contributing factor and the interaction among them. It is 
probable that each of  the phenomena discussed above has contributed, 
perhaps in different degrees in different countries depending upon such 
factors as size of domestic market, per capita income level, and proximity 
to the major industrialized countries. What should be borne in mind 
throughout this volume is that the links between more rapid economic 
growth and developments in the labor market are not entirely under- 
stood. In general there is a fairly strong presumption that factors that 54  Chapter Three 
tend to increase the rate of economic growth also tend to shift the demand 
for labor more rapidly to the right. Insofar as the rest of this book focuses 
upon commodity composition and factor substitution effects of  alterna- 
tive trade regimes, it may be that the single most important effect of 
choice of  trade regimes upon employment is overlooked. 